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Carlson: Industrial Dynamics

A new technique for first identifying and then correct
ing the underlying causes of major trouble spots in an
industrial organization has been under development for
past three
at the Sprague Electric Company.
Here’s a first-hand report
how well it has worked—

INDUSTRIAL
DYNAMICS
by Bruce Carlson
Sprague Electric Company

controlling a home
furnace . ..
man driving an automobile . . .
A manufacturing company . . .
At first glance, the three have
absolutely nothing in common. But
on closer review, they do have one
single identifying similarity.
Each represents an information
feedback system in which a stimu
lus—the temperature, another car, a
change in orders—causes a reaction.
The reaction in turn affects the
stimulus. The change in the stimu
lus then creates a further reaction.
The process is one of continual in
terplay and adjustment, as informa
tion flows back and forth within the
system.
Each the three is a closed loop
information system, in which one
action creates a reaction which
modifies the first action. The ther
mostat, when the temperature drops
below a certain level, switches on a
thermostat
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furnace. When the furnace brings
the temperature up to the desired
level, the thermostat turns the fur
nace off. The man driving down the
street automatically reacts when his
car deviates from the speed or direc
tion he desires; and his reaction cor
rects the deviation.
business follows much the same
pattern, except that its reaction
time is much slower. A rise in orders
will call forth a reaction within the
business, but it may take weeks to
occur, because so many factors and
so many people are involved. The
necessary information needed by
each of the people to make the cor
rect decisions about the action to be
taken has a time lag factor much
longer than that present in the case
of the man driving down the street.
The man can react almost instanta
neously; the corporate enterprise
will take much longer.
Yet both are dynamic; both do re

act to stimuli which they, in turn,
modify.
This extremely general phenome
non is the underlying basis for a new
management theory called Indus
trial Dynamics. Relatively new, that
is. Actually, the theory has its roots
in work in electrical engineering
which has been evolving since 1937,
but we at Sprague Electric were
the first to systematically apply it to
an industrial situation.
Basically, Industrial Dynamics in
volves the construction of verbal,
graphical, and then mathematical
models of the closed loop feedback
characteristics of the most important
activities of an industrial system. In
the models, conditions—or more pre
cisely, delayed and distorted infor
mation about conditions—are the
bases for decisions that control ac
tions which in turn alter the condi
tions that are the bases for other de
cisions, and so on.
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trial Dynamics and operations re
Flow channel
search are the differences between
— — Information sources
systems engineering and operations
research. By a better understanding
of the entire relevant system, engi
neers try to improve its perform
ance. On the other hand, operations
researchers traditionally focus on
getting mathematically optimum so
lutions problems arising in a rela
tively small part of the system. In
dustrial Dynamics models are con
structed to follow the broad out
lines of
important facets a sys
tem and to reveal the causes of be
havior that could not be found by
examining each of the system’s parts
separately.

Goes beyond systems analysis
This may seem like a description
of the ordinary systems approach
used in business, in which painstak
ing research into all details a com
pany’s operations eventually results
in flow charts that show the com
As pany as a total, functioning entity.
To a degree this is true, but the In
dustrial Dynamics approach goes
beyond representing the functions
within a single company and be
yond the flow chart stage to mathe
matical equations which are simu
lated on a large-scale electronic
computer.
Every ID model has four basic
features:

Levels which represent the accumu
lations at various points in the sys
tem at any given point in time. An
inventory, a bank balance, the
people in a department, are each
a level. Looking at them another
way, levels exist everywhere there
are delays in flow rates.
Flow Rates are the present move
ments between levels. Flow rates in
dicate activity; levels measure the
state to which the system has been
brought by the activity.
An example: an electric power
generating station. Its total capacity
would be a level; the demands made
upon that capacity would be a flow.
If demands exceeded capacity, ad
ditional capacity would have to be

The basic Industrial Dynamics model is based on levels and flow rates.
the contents of one level flow to another level, information about
flow is relayed to decision functions that control the rates of flow.

constructed. So flow rates determine
levels—as levels do flow rates.
An example: inventory reorders.
When stock in inventory (a level)
goes below a certain predetermined
point, additional stock is ordered
from the factory. Movement of
goods (a flow rate) from factory (a
level) to inventory (a level) will
change both factory and inventory
levels.
Decision functions or rate equations
determine how the information re
ceived about levels leads to the de
cision whether to lower or increase
a flow rate. Thus, in the simplest ex
ample, an automatic reorder point
for inventory would initiate an in
crease in the flow rate from factory
to inventory whenever that point
was passed.
Information channels are the media
connecting decision functions
levels.
It is the Industrial Dynamics
thesis that this basic structure can
be used to describe the simple net
works that, when all put together,
form the company model. Six or
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of of 

fewer networks generally provide a
meaningful model of an industrial
situation.
The materials network, which repre
sents all flow rates and levels of
physical goods.

The orders network, which includes
orders for materials, requisitions for
new employees, purchase
new
plant or office space.
The money network. Here money is
used only in the sense of actual cash,
with money flow the movement
payments between money levels.
The bank balance is a money level
under this concept; accounts receiv
able and price are not included;
they are part of the over-all informa
tion network which interconnects
all the others.

The personnel network, which out
lines the company’s position in terms
of available manpower and utiliza
tion of manpower. Obvious levels
here would be the labor pool, men
in training, men working at the fac
tory. Flow rates would be the rates
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at which workers were moving from
one level to another.
The capital equipment network,
which includes factory and storage
space, tools and equipment. Flow
rates would include the installation
new equipment and production
space, and the discard rate of old
machines.
Finally, and most important of all,
there is the interconnecting informa
tion network. Obviously none of the
five subsidiary networks can exist in
a vacuum; decisions in each are in
fluenced by information flowing in
from other networks. So the infor
mation network is the co-ordinating
system for all the others, transfer
ring information about any level to
decision points using that informa
tion in any network.
An example:
radical change in
the orders network will invariably
affect the materials network, and
could affect the personnel and capi
tal equipment network
well. It
should certainly be communicated
to the money network. Thus, the in
formation network has the job of
tying together the entire company
into a cohesive whole able to make
a co-ordinated response, just
the
nerves in the human body make
possible a logical and controlled re
sponse to some outside stimulus.

Industrial Dynamics at Sprague
Sprague Electric Company is the
country’s largest producer of capaci
tors and other electronic and electri
cal circuit components. Research
and engineering have long been the
animating spirit of the company,
and profits over the years have been
the largest when the percentage of
new products has been the highest.
This has led to a recognition of the
pervasiveness of change, while at
the same time management’s profit
consciousness has resulted in a
search for better ways
doing
things that carries over into the field
of management, as well
product
development. In 1957, a joint re
search project to find ways to im
prove the operation of one of our
important product lines was under
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by Sprague
the Massa
chusetts Institute of Technology.
Jay Forrester, a member of the
M.I.T. faculty and the founder of
Industrial Dynamics, was the proj
ect leader. The product chosen was
a miniature paper capacitor which
had been in production for about
ten years, and is sold to a variety
customers whose annual usage was
relatively stable, but whose total
weekly order volume fluctuated
very widely.
The first approach taken by Pro
fessor Forrester and his team was
construction of what would now be
considered a conventional mathe
matical model of the company’s production-inventory operations. The
model used order-by-order, item-byitem statistical simulation of the
Monte Carlo type. Forrester soon
became convinced that the ap
proach was not comprehensive
enough. The model was not oriented
toward the most important mana
gerial decisions concerning the
product; the interaction of the com
pany with its market and labor
supply. It presented a static picture
of a part of what was really a con
stantly changing situation, and thus
could not lead to any significant
basic improvement in the system.
He therefore persuaded manage
ment that a better approach was to
construct a model which empha
sized the information feedback
characteristics of the system, which
gave greater recognition to the in
teracting delays and decisions with
in the system, and to its behavior
as a whole.
The goal was to reduce costs and
improve delivery service by stabiliz
ing our inventory and production
levels. We are in a business which is
not seasonal, but which does have
cyclical swings in incoming orders
which also appeared, but in greater
magnitude, in our manpower and
inventory variations. One of the first
things revealed by our study of the
models was that our old practices
actually were a contributing cause
of the fluctuations in manpower, in
ventory and even incoming orders.
How? It was a matter of timing
and a human tendency to overcom
pensate in time of crisis. But these

causes were obscured in the multi
tude of complex day-to-day details
of the business. It was intensive in
vestigation and the controlled ex
periments performed by simulating
the models that enabled us to detect
them. The roots of the problem were
not in our order processing and
scheduling procedures, as common
ly believed, but rather in our em
ployment and inventory reordering
practices.

Delivery cycle vital
For the capacitor and many of our
products, the delivery cycle is the
vital competitive factor. Because
these components have been on the
market for a long time, the quality
provided by reputable suppliers is
about equal. Prices of important
producers are also at about the same
level. But delivery time is vital.
Many of our customers are working
on government or industrial con
tracts where heavy penalties accrue
if promised delivery dates are
missed. It is essential that they have
the components they need at pre
cisely the time they need them.
But there are fluctuations in
week-by-week orders, so that we
cannot detect a continuing rise in
the order flow until several weeks
have passed. In our business you
can’t have a "shape up” every morn
ing, and that is just about what
would be necessary if we immedi
ately reacted to every change in
order rate. On the other hand, if we
react too slowly, order backlogs and
consequently delivery delays will
put us at a competitive disadvan
tage.
We were thus faced with a situa
tion that ran roughly like this:
A rising order flow would not
change our production level at all to
start with. Orders would be filled
from inventory as much
possible
with the factory manufacturing "to
order” components and replenishing
inventory as best it could. Over a
period of rising sales, however,
backlogs would increase
would
inventories after a brief initial de
cline. By the time the over-all rise
in orders was detected and steps
taken to increase production, aver
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age delivery time would have
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lengthened.
Shortly our customers would be
come aware of the lengthening, and
would increase their lead time for
orders so they could be assured of
meeting their delivery dates. Cus
tomers ordering farther in advance
place orders over and above those
hey already have in the pipeline,
hence causing a total order rise
greater than would occur if we
could have maintained our normal
delivery time. This put an even
heavier load on the factory, thus
exaggerating what appeared to be
the necessary increase in production
capacity.
Our inventory policy, which was
much like any that is based on tra
ditional rules of thumb—for in
stance, maintaining four weeks of
sales—or, that is derived by con
ventional OR techniques—as in fill
ing a constant 95 per cent of orders
from stock—also aggravated the
problem. Why? Because when sales
increased not only did actual inven
tories go down, but desired inven
tories went up and alert inventory
control people placed more than the
normal number of inventory replen
Major system details of the Sprague Electric Company's inventory
ishment orders on production. So,
production function. Orders flowing into the Customer (Input B, top
not only were production people
right) cause the Customer Engineering department to issue orders to
its own Production department and to the component supplier (the
scrambling to keep up with an in
Company,
bottom box). Incoming customer orders are separated into
crease in customer orders, but also
stock orders which go directly to Inventory, and special
which
with inventory orders.
go into Backlog to be transmitted to Production. Under the old pat
Increasing production capacity,
tern, as Backlog of orders built up, it was reflected in Employment

for Sprague Electric, within broad
policy, which caused the Employment level to rise as the Company
drew on the Labor pool by raising the rate of hiring and training more
limits means simply hiring ad
workers
for Manufacturing.
ditional workers. However, such
workers have to be trained. Thus, in
addition to the time it took us to de
versely, inventory was falling while
delay shortened and, consequently,
cide
hire additional workers,
after a time customers began order
production was falling. This,
there was a further lag before we
ing less far ahead.
course, amplified the production
could begin to whittle down de
There was, in other words, a
downswing, so that production went
livery delay. During this time cus
lower than sales. In other words, our
vicious cycle, producing oscillations
tomers continued to increase the
in production, inventory, and man
inventory policy both increased the
lead time on their orders, which
power far greater than the total
peaks and decreased the valleys
turn caused even bigger backlogs,
change in sales. In our effort take
our production fluctuations.
and even greater delivery delays
corrective action, we were actually
It was postulated that a system
until the new employees and those
aggravating it. In their effort to take
which was more sensitive to incom
training them became productive
corrective action, our customers,
ing orders, less sensitive to backlogs,
enough to start reducing the back
too, were further aggravating the
and in which inventory orders were
logs.
problem.
increased when sales were falling
At this point there were more
This showed up very clearly in
and decreased when sales were ris
people in production than necessary
the models. We found that our in
ing would help dampen the ex
to take care of incoming orders. As
ventory was peaking shortly after
treme fluctuations in production.
backlogs returned to what were con
production peaked, and was rising
This proved true when tested with
sidered normal levels, the delivery
while production was rising. Con
the models. The result: a greater
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stability in inventory and employ
ment, and, concomitantly, a better
delivery delay situation.

Implementation
We first experimented with the
program in actual operations on a
tentative basis. Implementation of
the new policies began in early
1961, and the weekly employment
decision rule was being used on a
routine basis by September of that
year. Although middle ine man
agement had been fully informed
about the project from the start, and
was often asked to give advice on
various points, it did not really par
ticipate fully in the project until the
implementation phase was reached.
In the early phases of the implemen
tation, much time and effort were
spent by both company and M.I.T.
personnel in educating line manage
ment by explaining in detail the new
policies and what they were de
signed to achieve. No one was
forced to follow the new procedures;

each
executive
involved
was per
Carlson:
Industrial
Dynamics
sonally sold the idea of the new
methods. In return, the managers
suggested minor modifications to the
policies and pointed out a number
of additional problems—the deter
mination of inventory reorder
points, systems changes necessary
to generate more easily the informa
tion required to operate the new
policies, and so forth—the solutions
to which improved the systems be
havior. Actual results of deviations
from the new methods were
checked against results predicted by
the model under the new policies.
The answer was conclusive. If we
continued to build some inventory
during a period of falling sales, and
let it temporarily drop during a
period of rising sales, we would be
able to stabilize both our work force
and our inventory, and cut down
the extreme oscillations in produc
tion that had been characteristic
the product line. Over a period of
time, considerable interest devel
oped in the application of the new



employment decision rule and it was
followed closely.
The production scheduler was
given a priority list of program stock
items that could be produced when
ever factory capacity exceeded that
necessary for customer orders. On
the other hand, customer orders are
always given priority over inventory
replenishment orders. Finally, we
changed our policies so that total
authorized employment each week
was based on long-term average
sales and inventory adjustment over
a long period of time (to better bal
ance the absorption of sales fluctua
tion between inventory and employ
ment).
We should make clear at this
point that the new policies, and par
ticularly the employment decision
rule, did not replace the existing
system completely, but rather
served to provide an additional in
put to decisions that were then and
still are being made by operating
management. In fact, there have
been and still are occasions when
the rule is disregarded, because it is
very difficult for line managers con
ditioned by years of experience to
reacting intuitively to sudden
changes in business conditions to
accept with complete faith the rela
tively slow reaction times called for
by the policies of the I.D. model.
The important thing, however, is
that despite occasional deliberate
deviations, the new policies con
tinue to influence the decision
maker and he to influence the poli
cies, which have undergone a num
ber of minor modifications.

Results

Time

Figure illustrates production-inventory pattern under old system
at Sprague. As production rose to meet orders, inventory levels
followed rise. But the increase in production and inventory auto
matically
in drop in orders as backlog was reduced.
Thus production peaked as orders were declining, and inventory
reached highest point after production had begun to fall off.
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On the basis of our experience to
date, we can report a number of
tangible accomplishments which we
believe are directly attributable to
the application of the model. These
are as follows:
1. Comparison of data before and
after implementation of the new
policies shows that productivity,
measured in units per man-hour, in
creased by 12 per cent. This we be
lieve is partly the result of the more
stable employment called for by the
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Sprague’s own actions and those
new decision rule, and partly the re
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A Magazinecustomers
of Planning,
and Controls,
sult of aggressive
methods
improve
in Systems,
a closed-loop
feed Vol. 1 [1964], No. 2, Art. 7
back system. It had been assumed
ment programs.
from the start of the project that the
2. The production cycle has been
long-term fluctuations arose in large
slightly shortened, as a result
the
part because the customer tends to
of
higher productivity and improved
follow
a policy of ordering farther
scheduling procedures.
ahead as the company’s service de
3. The inventory level is being used
lay becomes long, and of holding
to absorb factory pressure in periods
orders back when the delay be
of peak sales by cutting back inven
comes short. In other words, the
tory production and allowing the in
company’s employment decisions
ventory level to fall. In one period
which directly affect the delay time
of peak employment before the
are reflected in the customer’s order
changes, inventory was rising at the
ing rate. Thus, by modifying its own
rate of 10 per cent of the average
policies along the lines of the model,
sales rate. At peak employment after
it was hoped to damp out fluctua
the changes, inventory was falling at
tions in the incoming order rate. We
the rate
over 11 per cent of the
are sorry to say that this has not
average
rate, and this con
been achieved; after more than two
tributed to a variation in employ
Industrial Dynamics,
years, incoming orders for the prod
ment that was considerably less
although a relatively new
uct in question are fluctuating as
than would probably have occurred
widely
ever, and it has been
technique, has already
under the old policies.
necessary to modify the employ
created fierce controversy,
ment decision rule in recognition of
4. Inventory is better balanced, be
Its backers feel that it is far
this fact. The importance of the
cause of certain procedural changes
more significant than the
feedback concept in virtually all
suggested in the course of the study
more
conventional opera
and the use of computer-established
socio-economic systems is one of the
tions research methods,
cornerstones of the Industrial Dy
reorder points.
namics approach. Although this is
because it suggests solutions
probably a valid concept, our proj
No attempt has been made to
to more basic problems than
ect does not, to date, support the
measure exactly the effect on profits
can be attacked by O.R.
part of the philosophy which im
of the new policies. This would be
techniques. The difference
plies that a relatively few easily dis
a very difficult and costly under
between the two approaches
cernible factors interact to form
taking requiring extensive changes
feedback loops which persistently
the difference that exists
in company-wide accounting sys
dominate the behavior
a given
tems, which are not deemed worth
between strategy and tactics,
system.
while in view of the fact that the
in this view, Many O,R, ex
study has been confined to one
perts, on the other hand, do
product line among approximately
Evaluation
not feel Industrial Dynamics
fifty on which profit information
has proved itself in any
Let us attempt an evaluation of
must be compiled. Instead, all con
way . . .
Industrial Dynamics in light of
cerned have agreed that the record
the Sprague experience and touch
of operations since the new policies
briefly on some of the problems we
were introduced clearly shows im
The three most important ones,
provements. Some of these improve
in my opinion, are (1) the scope of
ments have, we believe, resulted
Industrial Dynamics models; (2)
from the application of more con
the level of aggregation of model
ventional systems and procedures
variables; and (3) validation of In
and quantitative decision-making
dustrial Dynamics models.
techniques, but it is also probably a
With respect to model scope, we
fact that these changes stemmed in
are not sure that we have learned
large measure from the insights pro
vided by the model simulations.
how to determine what the scope
should be, or whether the amount of
In one major respect, however,
the Sprague Industrial Dynamics
detail that was finally included in
project has not had the predicted
our model is the right amount. In
effect. This was in the area of long
this stage of the development
In
term fluctuations in recurring or
dustrial Dynamics, primary reliance
ders and the interaction between
must be placed on intuitive judg-
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ment in determining scope. For ex
ample, because the Sprague model
omitted explicit representation of
the company’s competitors, there is
some question whether the com
pany’s market is adequately repre
sented.
Another problem arises from the
necessity to include, in order to
have a closed feedback loop, a
model sector representing the com
pany’s customers, about whose
operating policies little is actually
known. As we pointed out earlier,
we have postulated certain appar
ently logical responses by the cus
tomer to the delivery delay he sees
on Sprague’s part, but we do not
know enough about what deter
mines his ordering decisions to say
that our customer sector is a correct
representation of what really hap
pens. The fact that operation of the
new policies has not yet had any
noticeable effect on the fluctuations
in incoming orders reinforces this
feeling, although it may be that in
sufficient time has elapsed for the
feedback effect to be noticed.
With respect to the aggregation
variables, no systematic way has
been developed for aggregating
nonlinear elements of the system.
For example, in the Sprague model
we are aggregating orders from dif
ferent kinds of customers in a num
ber of different industries, and we
are aggregating orders calling for
immediate delivery and orders call

ing for extended future deliveries.
We hope this is justified because the
differences among these various
categories are not dynamically im
portant, but there is no way of being
sure of this. With all the random
fluctuations in the available infor
mation about real-world phenom
ena, it is virtually impossible to de
tect underlying causal mechanisms
from existing data. We are therefore
forced to rely on the opinions of
operating people who are close
enough to have formed opinions
about what is important in a given
activity, but who are also close
enough to it to have biased views.
With respect to the validation of
Industrial Dynamics models, Jay
Forrester has stated that:
“The significance of a model de
pends upon how well it serves its
purpose. The purpose of Industrial
Dynamics models is to aid in design
ing better management systems.
The final test of satisfying this pur
pose must await the evaluation of
the better management. In the
meantime the significance of models
should be judged by the importance
of the objectives to which they are
addressed and their ability to pre
dict the results of system design
changes.”*
We believe the present Sprague
*Forrester, Jay W., Industrial Dynam
ics (M.I.T. Press and John Wiley & Sons
Inc., 1961), p. 115.

Diagram illustrates decision and information feedback pattern. In
formation influences decisions which determine actions. Results of ac
ons taken become information which in turn influences subsequent de
of
cisions. These in turn affect subsequent actions in a continuous chain.
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model has “served its purpose,” in
that it has led to the design of im
proved management policies relat
ing to important operating objec
tives of our company. It has
demonstrated an ability to predict
the results of system design changes
in some areas, but has not succeeded
in damping out the large fluctua
tions in the order rate. However,
we are sufficiently satisfied with the
results to date that we have ex
tended the use of policies similar to
those tested by the model to at least
one other product line, and prob
ably will extend them to still others
in the future.
We have the impression that In
dustrial Dynamics as a discipline is
increasingly concerned with the
more intangible aspects of industrial
behavior. This may be because one
is more immediately aware, in pro
duction-distribution systems of the
type represented by this first
Sprague model, of problems
scope, aggregation, and others 1
have not mentioned. Moreover, in
such systems, available data are apt
to be distorted, making it difficult
to sort out the really significant
causal relationships that must be
represented in a model. Another
difficulty in applying Industrial Dy
namics to these more tangible types
of problem is that the system
changes suggested by Industrial
Dynamics models may be in direct
conflict with other more convention
al control techniques. It may, there
fore, be very difficult to apply the
new policies in one area of a com
pany’s operation without applying
them throughout, which may well
entail dropping some cherished con
trol procedures and devising new
ones to more adequately measure
system response.
The Industrial Dynamics project
at Sprague Electric has followed a
similar evolution. In a general way,
we have applied Industrial Dynam
ics to higher level problems in con
trast to the relatively low-level
production-distribution system rep
resented by the model discussed
here. Higher level problems deal
with such things as new product
growth, divisional growth, or total
7



corporate growth.
In general,
they
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are more important, more long
range, and more difficult to solve.
Most significantly, they deal more
with intangibles, and the benefits
of a study are likely to come more
from insights gained in making a
study than from any mathematical
decision rules that may emerge.
When applied to solving tangible
problems, we believe Industrial Dy
namics is slower and more costly
than conventional operations re
search techniques, and to date has
probably yielded smaller payoffs,
although it has certainly pointed out
some important shortcomings of
certain widely accepted analytical
procedures. One thing we are cer
tain of is that Industrial Dynamics
will profoundly influence the de
velopment of other management
science techniques. This has hap
pened already at Sprague Electric,
where, it should be added, we are
continuing to devote a portion of
our management research effort to
more conventional areas manage
ment science.
It appears to us that the concep
tual relevance of Industrial Dynam
ics is being more widely accepted
today in the business schools than
it is in industry, and we hope that
the experience of Sprague Electric
In any industrial system, the simple information-feedback loop shown
Company and others with this
on
facing
becomes an infinitely more complex multiple loop,
powerful new philosophy will help
interconnected system. Decisions are made at many points through
to bring it to the attention of more
out the system, each of which results in actions that create informa
and more business managers.
tion to be used at various other decision
in the complex.

One of the major advantages
claimed for Industrial Dynamics by
its partisans is that it is far more eas
ily understood by management all
down the line than some of the eso
teric mathematical techniques em
ployed in conventional operations

research applications. All equations
in Industrial Dynamics, for exam
ple, are expressed in a form of short
hand representing common business
words. Thus: one term of an equa
tion might be IFAC, which would
stand for Inventory, Finished, Ac
tual at Customer (Units). Since
many equations encompass time,
three arbitrary symbols, J, K, and L
are used to represent periods

time. J represents the previous solu
tion time
an equation, K repre
sents the present moment, and L
represents the next solution of the
equation. (The time interval be
tween J and K and between K and
L is always fixed, and is known as
Delta Time.)
Thus, a complete equation to de
termine the state of a present level
would be:
IFAC.K = IFAC.J. (DT)(UAIC.
JK—URMC.JK)
Meaning
the terms:
IFAC.K—Inventory, Finished, Ac
tual at Customer (Units) at present
time, K
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IFAC.J—Inventory, Finished, Ac
tual at Customer (Units) at past
time, J
DT—Delta Time (weeks)
UAIC.JK—Units Arriving at Inven
tory at Customer (Units/week)
during the time interval, JK
URMC.JK—Units Received in Man
ufacturing at Customer (Units/
week) during the time interval, JK
In other words, inventory at cus
tomer at present time is equal to
inventory at previous solution time
plus the difference between addi
tions to inventory and shipments
from inventory during the interval
from previous solution time to pres
ent moment.
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